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In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) to regulate employee
pension plans' as a response to turnoil caused by
"highly publicized pension plan disasters," and as a
way to regulate benefit and pension plans on a national
level. What began as a seemingly straightforward
piece of legislation has grown and expanded into a
complicated area of lass, encompassing a broad range
of statutes and regulations.'
Individual states now take on the financial burden
of rising health care costs.5  For instance, states
are expanding health care Funding for their poorest
residents because little agreement at the federal level
exists in how to respond to the problem of providing
indigent individuals with adequate health care
services.' Recent reports indicate that states pay 43
percent of total Medicaid costs and Medicaid spending
comprises 22.9 percent of state budgets.' In light of
this more active role for states, a question exists as to
whether ERISA preemption will prevent significant
health care reform at the state level.' According to the
most recent court decisions, it appears that ERISA will
continue to have a severe impact on state health care
reforms.
IBackground
As America faces what can be characterized as a health
care crisis, addressing the dual goals of containing
costs while expanding access becomes increasingly
important.9 Aggregate health care costs in America
are tremendous, making up roughly 16 percent of
this country's gross domestic product.' One major
problem is the impact on a health care sy stem forced to
absorb the cost of 46.1 million uninsured Americans."
Additionally, while the United States spends the most
money on health care, Americans are among the least
healthy people in the industrialized world.'
A. 1111- \The Chann Lamnd0sca pe of Health C(ar,,,e
in Am,,erica
When Congress enacted EIMSA in 1974. it seemed no
one could hasve predicted the problems vwith America's
health care sy stem today. Fess could hasve knowvn
that states would play such a crucial role in solving
these problems. At the time of ERISA's enactment,
the health care system in this country looked very
different from how it does today.1 For instance,
the simple patient-doctor paradigm that existed in
1974 has been replaced by a much more complex
system of Managed Care Organizations (MCO).14
T'he rise of MCOs and the shifts in the financing of
health care coverage have changed how - and even
if- Americans are insured. [be Health Maintenance
Organization (lIMO) Act of 1973 provided MCOs
with an economic edge over more traditional forms
of health insurance.' As a result, MCOs grew more
competitive and began to offer better premiums to
employers because MCOs could leverage their costs
through contractual agreements with providers to
give comprehensive coverage to members, financial
incentives to use member providers, and accountability
through quality assurance programs. 1 Attempting
to appeal to employers providing health care, MCOs
needed to improve their bottom line and achieved his
by controlling costs and provider incentives."
The shift to increased employer-provided coverage
in the 1990's demonstrates how much health care
systems have changed since ERISA's enactment.'
IThe purpose of ERISA was to achieve uniformity in a
regulatory scheme for employee benefits and, perhaps
more importantly, pension funds. Congress, however,
arguably "paid little heed to its implications for medical
care." Today, the reality is that many state laws
seeking to regulate health care plans now face a high
probability offERISApreemption.2 ERISA's language
includes regulation of any "employee welfare benefit
plan" and any plans provided by an employer to offer
coverage of any "medical, surgical, or hospital care
benefits." These regulations have had far-reaching
effects on state laws that attempt to regulate such
benefit plans.> ERISA's unforeseen intrusion into
state sovereignty has also generated enormous amounts
of litigation over state health care laws. In addition
to states' inability to change substantially health
care lass sws ithout the threat of ERISA pieemption,
inldiv idual patients canlnot sue under state lasss, vshichk
more often than not, prosvide more relict for indiv idual
plauntiffs because ERISA eniollees may only receive
ERISA remedies.22
Supreme Court decisions often turn on the Court's
interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause. Section
514(a) of ERISA mandates the preemption of
"any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . . 23
The purpose of this section was to ensure uniformity
in laws regulating IRISA benefit plans; however,
Supreme Court decisions have led to the preemption
o various state health care laws.24
In Shaw v. Delta, the Supreme Court considered
whether ERISA preempted a New York human rights
law that prohibited discrimination in employment,
including discrimination based on sex or pregnancy.25
The law included pregnancy as a disability and required
employ er-provided coverage for pregnancy-related
disabilities.26 Delta Airlines and various other airlines
that provided health benefits to employees through
plans subject to ERISA brought a federal declaratory
judgment action against New York state claiming
that ERISA preempted the state's human rights and
disability laws."
The Supreme Court first looked to congressional intent
regarding ERISAX's Section 514(a) preemption clause.28
In so doing, the Court took a textualist approach.
Referring to Section 514(a)'s "relates to" language, the
Court asserted that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee
benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it
has a connection with or reference to such a plan."29
IThe Court only looked to the plain language of New
York laws and found that both laws related to plans
for preemption purposes. Citing congressional intent,
the Court reasoned that Congress could have decided
to limit the preemption clause, leaving the Court to
interpret the preemption clause as it saw fit; however,
Congress failed to so act.3o
S/aw virtually guaranteed ERISA preemption fr state
laws that regulated employee benefits. T he Court's
interpretation of "relates to" preempted any state lasw
that had any effect, cxven if indirectly, on emploxyee
benefit plans." One judge's description ot this broad
interpietation as a "preemptixve vortex that could
sxvallowx xvirtually any state reniedial laxw" remained
for years until the Court started to liniit ERISAS
preemption.3
In New' York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v Travelers Insurance Co., which challenged
another New York law. the Supreme Court narrowed
ERISA's preemption power.3 New York required
hospitals to take surcharges from patients covered by
certain commercial insurers but did not require the same
surcharge for Blue Cross/Blue Shield subscribers.
Commercial insurers brought suit in federal district
court seeking to invalidate the surcharge statute under
ERISA. 6 Consequently, the Court had to reassess the
meaning of the "relates to" language of the preemption
provision.3
As it had done in Shaw, the Supreme Court began
its analysis by turning to the statutory language and
congressional intent of Section 514(a).3 The Court
first acknowledged the important presumption that
"Congress does not intend to supplant state law,"
thereby suggesting a narrower interpretation of
Section 514(a) than in Shaw. ILooking at the plain
language of Section 514(a), the Court noted that 'lilt
'relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest stretch
of its indeterminacy, then tor all practical purposes
preemption would never run its course, for 'Irjeally,
universally, relations stop nowhere." 40
Finding the statutory language unhelpful, the Court
examined the purpose of ERIS,41 Citing its own
precedent, the Court held that Congress intended
to ensure a "uniform body of benefits law" and to
reduce the number of conflicting laws between states
and/or between states and the federal government.42
Further, the Court distinguished the surcharge law at
issue from the laws in Slaw, which related to ERISA,
because they mandated certain coverage requirements,
while the purpose and effect of New York's surcharge
lawx was different. 43 Rather than mandating certain
coverage requirements, the surcharge statute merely
had an "indirect economic effect on choices made by
insurance buyers," by creating financial incentives
to purchase a "Blues" plan over other commercial
insurers.44
The Court thus found no grounds for ERISA
preemption because the lawx only affected the costs of
serv ices -not the administration of [RIbS plans or the
unifommity ot benefit plans. 4 5 Recogniiing that xvaiious
factors affect cost, the Court rejected Delta Airline's
attempt at federal preemption because "nothing in the
language of ERISN' indicated that Congress intended
to 'displace general health care regulation..."
xvhich traditionally had been controlled at a state and
local lexvel.46 funVelerS' linmted xviexx of preeniption
essentially proxvided state laws, wh lich wxould not
haxve surxvixved under Shaw, sonic hope of sunvival.4 7
Nonetheless, ERISA preemption continues to prove a
substantial obstacle to reformi of state law s in health
care 48
'The Supreme Court continued its IERISA analysis in
California Division ofLabor Standards Enjfrcement
v. Dillingham, a California case involving a prevailing
wage law that required contractors on public
works projects to pay a lower wage to workers in
unapproved apprentice programs. 49 TWo contractors
argued that their apprenticeship programs were an
"enployee welfare benefit plan" qualifying as a plan
under ERISA, which, according to the contractors,
should preempt the prevailing California wage law.
Relying on leavelers and other cases, however, the
Supreme Court rejected this argument."
The Dillingham Court applied a two-part test to
determine if the law "related" to an ERISA plan: "if
[the law] (1) had a connection to or (2) reference to
such a plan" then it would be considered to relate to
an ERISA plan.5 Similar to leavelers, the Court in
Dillingham looked to congressional intent because a
mere "uncritical literalism" application of this two-
part test was insufficient to determine preemption.
Accordingly, the Court compared California's
prevailing wage laws to the surcharge law in Travelers
and found them indistinguishable. Similar to New
York's law in Travelers, California's law did not
"bind" ERISA plans to a certain structure, nor did it
dictate the choices under the plan; it merely created
incentives.541 he Court concluded "[w]e could not
hold pre-empted a state law in an area of traditional
state regulation based on so tenuous a relation without
doing grave violence to our presumption that Congress
intended nothing oft the sort."5
I hree years after Dilling/ham , however, the Court
upheld federal preemption of a state lasw that could be
characterized as having a "tenuous relation" with an
RISA plan. Ege/hoff iinvolved a Washington state
statute that automatically revoked the designation of
a spouse as a beneficiary of certain assets, including
employee benefit plans, upon divorce.56 As the named
beneficiary of his plan, Mr. Egelhoff's ex-wife stood
to collect his life insurance proceeds upon his death.
Mr. Fgeltsoff's children trom a prexvious Inarriage
sued, arguing their status as the true beneficiaries
under Washinoton laxx."
Apply ing the framexxork of S/haw, Trastlers, and
Din/lgmam, xxhich looked to the objeetives of ERI SA
to determine if a state lass "related to" an ERISA plan,
the C oui't found that the Washington statute had an
"imnpermnissible connection" to BRISA.5 The hgc//moJJ
Coui't distinguished this connection xxith a pennissible
"incidental effect"' on ERISA, finding that the law
went to a core element ol RISA- namely, regulating
the payment of benefits." Further, the Court held that
the Washington law would force administrators to
learn the laws of every state before paying out benefits,
which is the sort of administrative burden Congress
intended ERISA to prevent.'
In their dissent, Justices lBreyer and Stevens noted that
the Court should remember the "strong presumption
against preemption" in this case because the Washington
statute regulated family property law, which is an
area of law traditionally dealt with exclusively by the
states.62 The dissent did not find a distinction between
non-preempted laws that might in some xway burden
administrators of plans (such as the lavs in havelens
and Dillingham) and a law, such as the Washington
law, that eased the administration of benefits and yet
was preempted.6 In addition, the dissent warned that
the majority's logic could eventually lead to federal
preemption in other areas traditionally left to states.64
Breyer and Stevens ultimately saw no conflict between
this law and ERISA, and thus no reason to preempt
it.65
In Retail IIndustry Leaders lssociations v IFiclder66
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down
Maryland's Fair Share Act aimed at forcing large
employers in the state to pay a certain percent of
revenue towards employees' health care benefits.61
Faced with rising Medicaid costs, the Maryland
legislature enacted this novel laxx to require employers
with 10,000 or more employees to pay at least 8 percent
of their payroll towards employee health benefits or
pay the difference directly to the State6 1 Because Wal-
Mart employed 16,000 workers in Maryland, it was
the only corporation affected.69
In finding that ERISA preempted the Fair Share Act,
the Fourth Circuit emphasized that ERISA's "primary
objective" xxas to "proxvide a uniform regulatory
regime oxver employeec benefit plans."' Citing the
decision in Shaw, the IFourth Circuit found that IERISA
preempted this lass because it directly regulated
"employ ers' contributions to or stiuctuiing of their
plans."n Although Wal-Mart technically had a choice
in deciding xvhether to nmeet the 8 pcircent threshold
the Fourth Circuit stated that Wal-Mart's only "rational
choice" xvas comnpliance, xxhich, in turn mandated hoxx
Wval-Mart structured its benefit plansn Additionally,
the court found that this laxx interrupted Wal-Mart's
ability to administer a uniforni national benefit plan
and that this "spending nandate would clash" with
other state laws., which is precisely what Congress intended to avoid with
the enactment of ERISA.
Though Maryland argued that the main purpose of the Fair Share Act was
to increase its Medical Assistance Program funds, the Fourth Circuit court
decided that the law's aim was to require employers to structure their benefit
spending in a particular way.I4 This structured how ERISA benefit plans
could provide certain benefits and spend their money, which the Fourth
Circuit characterized as impermissible under ERISA.16
The dissent, however, began its analysis by noting the state's extraordinary
health care costs and characterizing the Fair Share Act as a legitimate
response to what it viewed as a budgetary crisis." In its viewx, the l mx was
seen as a reasonable response to Congress' expectations that states would
help with the growing costs of Medicaid and Medicare. The dissent found
that the Act made no reference to ERISA and more importantly, did not
dictate choices of ERISA plans; rather, it merely created incentives for
employers to spend on health care in a particular way.
Irrespective of the holding in Retail Industry Leaders, the case is an
indication of things to come regarding how state laws regulate health care
and E RISA preemption. In the aftermath of this decision, it is less certain
whether states can in fact force employers to help cover the growing costs of
health benefits."o As a result, future reform will likely avoid the Fair Share
Act model and states will have to create mere incentives, not mandates, for
providers in order to survive ERISA preemption."
II.An alsi ss
Congress enacted ERISA for the narrow purpose of protecting individuals
from the mismanagement of their pensions, not to "serve as a comprehensive
federal health care regulation." Yet despite ERISA's original intent, it has
significantly affected states' abilities to enact substantial health care laws.
Retaillndustry Leaders serves as an additional example of a state legislature
attempting to address a budget crisis by encouraging employers to share
burdensome health care costs. While past court jurisprudence leaves room
for states to remedy health care spending crises with laws that "relate to"
ERISA. it remains unclear how the current Supreme Court might rule on a
case similar to Retail Industry Leaders. If the Fourth Circuit was correct
in its decision, then many other states' laws will face the same ERISA
preemption as Maryland's Fair Share Act.
A, TheFurhCircu-it Cou d Ha"ve Saved th ,e Fair Sdhoare
Given that Maryland enacted the Fair Sharc Act in rcsponse to a perceived
state-wxide health care crisis, thc Fourth Circuit arguably could haxve
dccided against tedcral precmption. tinder thc Suprcme Court's line of
FRISA cases and Retail Industry Leaders, tlhe court could haxe found a
more tenuous coixnection to FERISA plans, sucho as xwithi tlhe surchoarge laxw in
lravelers. Perhaps, the Fourth Circuit should haxve gixven more xxeight to a
legitimate state respoinse to its health care spending crisis. Further, tlhe Act
had iepercussions in public health, an aiea ot lawx traditionally iegulated
by states.
In Retail hIdustry Leaders, the Fourth Circuit first examined the scope
of ERISA's preemption provision and the "nature and elect" of the Act
to determine whether it was preempted by ERtSA. IThe Fourth Circuit
emphasized that Congress enacted ERIS-A to "provide a uniform regime
over employee benefit plans" and to reduce administrative burdens on plans
of complying with many varying state laws. 84 Under Shav, the court next
examined whether the Act "relateld] to" an ERISA plan and, further, if this
was the type of law that Congress intended to be preempted by ERISA.
Additionally,. the Act allowed for uniformity of administration of employee
benefit plans. As the dissent in Retail ndustry Leaders stated, a problem
might have existed if the Act "dictated a plan's system for processing
claims, paying benefits, or determining beneficiaries." as the Court found
happened in Egelho/- but that did not occur. Instead, the only impact
might have been a slight administrative inconvenience. For example, Wal-
Mart may have had to report certain data about its Mary-land employees and
its spending on Mary land employees' health care.0  This administrative
burden is not enough to trigger ERISA preemption, but rather, amounts
to an incidental inconvenience for employers to help defray rising health
care costs. i
The Fourth Circuit's narrow approach failed to look at other jurisprudential
guidance. Keystone C hapter Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v
Bell Telephone Co., a Third Circuit case, is instructive, in that the court
looked at whether a state law's effects on ERISA benefit plans "were
optional or avoidable" under the statute. "By upholding Pennsylvania's
Prevailing Wage Act, the Third Circuit found that the lax survived "through
means unconnected to ERISA plans. 0 While the Fourth Circuit could have
contemplated this "optional or avoidable" approach, it instead summarily
disposed of the issue ofxwhether employers truly had a choice under the Fair
Share Act. According to the Fourth Circuit., since adjusting a benefit plan to
meet the 8 percent threshold would be a more logical choice for employers,
rather than paying money to the State of Maryland, it really was the only
choice "If the court had looked at whether the effects were avoidable, it
may have decided that paying money to state was, arguably, a real option
that permitted W~al-Mart




to bc "innoxvat[ors,]" to O
help curb thc health cr
spendimng crisis.9 If morc
c.ourts tollowx the logic of
Retail hIdustry Leaders,
many states xwill likelx be x
restricted from reaching
this kind of innoxation. IThe dissent in Jgelho is especiallx informatixe
in explaining that IRISA' analy ses should begin xxith the presumption
that Congress did not intend to entirely remove state poxwer to legislate
health care issues."' This "pax or play" laxw xxas the flirst of its kind xwhen
the Nary land lcgislature first enacted it in 2006. though other states haxve
since bcgun to enact sinmilar laxx.95 Ultimately, xxhether LRtSA preempts
a state laxx xwill depend on hoxx carefullly legislators design thc laxw so as
to axoid exccssiv e interfercnce xxith ERISA plans. Other attenmpts to force
employers to share in the burden of health care costs could face preemption,
especially if they resemble Mary land's preempted Fair Share Act.
The Act became widely known as the' "WXal-Mart law."
which probably contributed to the Fourth Circuit's
rejection."1 In fact, the court called it a "stretch to
claim" that the Act was a "revenue statute of general
application."" The majority speculated that the
Maryland legislature intended for Xal-Mart to be the
only employer covered by the Act, especially since the
Act automatically exempted other large employers in
the state. Also, Giant Food stores already met the 8
percent threshold and a later amendment worked to
exclude Northrop Gruinman." Ihe majority believed
that the main purpose of Maryland's law was to force
large employers to provide a certain amount of health
care benefits to employees rather than to raise money
to defray health care costs.99 he fact that only \Xal-
Mart was affected was not sufficient to show this
was the legislature's intent. The laxw also specifically
created the "Health Care Fund" to support Maryland's
Medical Assistance Program, which provides care for
indigent individuals."
T-he majority in Retail Industry Leaders also noted a
lack of "meaningful alternatives" to adjusting benefit
plans to comply with the laxx "' Maryland had
argued that employers could comply by contributing
to employee health care in non-ERISA spending by
contributing to employees' Health Savings Accounts
(HSAs). The majority rejected that proposition,
opining that HSAs have limited availability, and that
few Wal-Mart employees would likely make this
election."12
In light of the Fourth Circuit's decision, the Maryland
legislature might somehow adjust the Act to allow for
more employer options. The state could also pursue
other alternatives to HSAs for increasing non-ERISA
spending, such as on-sight clinics." Furthermore,.
it might also help to build in more flexibility so that
employers have a meaningful alternative to changing
the structure of benefit spending. Maryland could
further emphasize that the law's core purpose is to
defray its health care spending crisis. If other states
can enact reforms that avoid the pitfalls of Retail
Industry Leaters, then meaningful health care reform
can exist at the state level.
wi'th EIA uvvn
Preempion
A, Massachu\,.,,setts\' Universal 1Healh 1-,,,Care
P an
In April 2006, the Massachusetts legislature passed,.
by a significant majority, a universal health care plan
that would aim to insure 90-95 percent of uninsured
residents - about 500.000 people.104 The law, which
took effect in June 2007 is the first of its kind to require
that all residents show proof of health insurance on their
annual tax returns. 115Failure to comply will result
in the loss of the personal income tax deduction and
further penalties."6 Ihe law also requires employers
with ten or more employees to offer their employees
health insurance or face annual assessments of $295
per employee."
The Massachusetts law represents the result of
extensive negotiations between businesses, health care
providers, hospitals, and insurers in an attempt to force
individuals and businesses to share responsibility for
the costs of health care."' The state will subsidize the
purchase of insurance plans for individuals who fall
between 100 and 300 percent of the poverty level by
requiring those who are healthy and uninsured to share
the risk.109 This sharing of risk involves spreading
costs among a larger group ot people and serxves as a
model of hoxx insurance should function. Ultimately,
the hope is that Massachusetts xwill be able to loxxer the
costs of health care for all its residents no
A key proxvision ot the MIassachusetts plan cieates
an "indiv idual mandate" requiring exvery indiv idual
to purchase some form of coxverage. "' the question
of ERISAX picciiptioii still cxists, lioweverc, foi tlic
"employ er mandate" that requires employ ee-proxvided
coverage. Anticipated revenues from this "penalty" are
about $50 million, but $295 per employee is arguably
an insignificant financial incentive for employers."'
T-here are a number of distinctions between the Massachusetts plan and
Maryland's Fair Share Act at issue in Retail Industry Leaders. First, the
Massachusetts law is not aimed at one particular employer. The Fourth
Circuit in Retail Industry Leaders emphasized that the law seemed to
focus on one employer, Wal-Mart, and was not really focused on raising
revenue."' Many individuals involved in enacting the Massachusetts lass
believed that it "struck a balance" between businesses, insurers, and health
care providers.114
Moreover the Massachusetts plan does not appear to represent an
impermissible "connection with" ERISA. Unlike the Fair Share Act, the
contribution of employers is just one element of insurance coverage rather
than exclusively employer participation. Under Travelers and Dillinghan,
it is unlikely that the Massachusetts law would "relate to" ERISA plans.
Similar to Travelers and Dillingham, the Massachusetts law does not refer
to ERISA plans, and does not affect the uniformity of administering ERISA
benelits to warrant preemption." At most, the annual penalty of $295 per
employee could be characterized as a mere "incentive," like the surcharge
law in lravelers. Further, this low fee provides a legitimate alternative for
employers who do not wish to provide or contribute to benetit plans for
employees. Massachusetts' law appears broad enough to survive ERISA
preemption. 6
& Calforni's Unve. rsal H1-ealth Care P an 
Notwxithstanding the Massachusetts plan, California's proposed universal
health care plan might be the most extensive plan in the country. California's
plan attempts to cover every resident at a total cost of nearly $12 billion."
There are about 6.5 million uninsured Californians (about 19 percent of its
36 million residents) the highest number of uninsured in the country."'
The plan would require employers with ten or more employees to offer
health care coverage or pay 4 percent of their payroll into a public health
program intended to help cover the uninsured.119 Additionally, physicians
would pay 2 percent, and hospitals 4 percent, of their revenues to help cover
residents enrolled in the State Medicaid program, Medi-Cal.120
In addition to likely challenges from health care industry lobbies, there
are possible ERISA-preemption problems, as well, if the requirement on
employers with ten or more employees to provide health insurance or pay 4
percent of their payrolls is viewed as a mandate.121 The plan's alternative to
providing health insurance (the payment of 4 percent of payrolls to a state-
wide fund) would also need to represent a viable choice for enployers to
avoid having an "unavoidable effect" on ERISA plans,122 especially since
the lack of a reasonable choice tfor employ ers in RetaillIndustry L eaders xwas
part of the Fourth Circuit's reasoning to dctermine that E RISA preempted
the Yet.
Similar to the Massachusetts plan. California's plan might surv ive
preemption because it is clearly not intended to apply to any one particular
emnploy er in the state. Employers wvith ten or more emnploy ees include a
large number of businesses. Also. employ ers under the plan hasve a viable
altenativec by pay ing 4 percent of total pay rollIs iinto a fund to help coxver
the uninsured. IThe California plan could also be eoinstrucd as creating
incentixes loi employers to provide health bcnefhts to employees and not
alternatives designed to incentivize employers to comply, the California
law has a high likelihood of surviving any potential IERIS A preemption.
As states begin addressing the growing costs oflhealth care, it is inportant to
design laws to avoid ERISA conflicts. Massachusetts and California seem
to have designed laws broad enough to cover a wide-range of employers
and might successfully avoid the problem the Maryland legislature had in
Retail Industry Leaders. A state law that merely has an indirect economic
effect on plans, like in Travelers, should also survive. As the Supreme
Court emphasized in Travelers, a lasw will likely survive so long as it does
not adversely impact the uniform administration of ERISA plans.124
Despite past failures to amend ERISA, this still remains a valid objective.'
ERISA's ettect on health care appears to be partially unintended, since
Congress initially enacted ERISA to regulate pension plans at a national
level."^ If states could desion laws to address health care needs without
the looming threat of ERISA preemption, they could more effectively
address the needs of their citizens, xwho ultimately bear the brunt of ERISA
preemption. Because courts are limited in restricting ERISA preemption,
Congress should revisit this lass. In the 33 years since Congress passed
ERISA, enough has changed to warrant amendments allowing state
innovation in health care reform.
1\\ \ Co0nc IU sio0n
In 2016, spending on health care in America is expected to reach $4.1
trillion roughly 20 percent of this country's gross domestic product.m In
addition to rising health care costs, 16 percent of the population lacks health
insurance.128 Whatever Congress intended ERISAto do with regard to health
care, there is little question that ERISArepresents a "substantial obstacle" to
meaningful health care reform for states.'2 If states want their health reform
laws to survive ERISA preemption, then legislatures must draft legislation
that is broadly applicable and not aimed at a particular employer.'30Ilshe
president of the National Coalition on IHealth Care, Ilenry Simmons, aptly
stated that: "[w]e can afford health-care reform . .. [w]hat we cannot afford
is a continued failure to address the crisis in health care."' IAs health care
costs and the number of uninsured increase, states must have the ability
to address the healthh care
needs of their resideats.
Given the potential
ramifications and the
lurisprudence on the :
issue, it is inconceivable
as a mandate, as the "indirect eflect" language demonstrates an incentive
rather than a mandate.13 Due to the broad applicability of this las, and the
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